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UNITED STATES PACIFIC
FLEET
AND OVERSEAS AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
Cincpac
File
A2-11
L11-1
13 February 1945
PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER 14CL-45
From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET and NAVAL SHORE ACTIVITIES, Pacific
Ocean Areas.
Subject: Damage in Typhoon, Lessons of.
1. On 18 December 1944, vessels of the Pacific Fleet, operating in support of
the invasion of the Philippines in an area about 300 miles east of Luzon, were
caught near the center of a typhoon of extreme violence. Three destroyers, the
HULL, MONAGHAN, and SPENCE, capsized and went down with practically all hands;
serious damage was sustained by the CL MIAMI, the CVLs MONTEREY, COWPENS, and
SAN JACINTO, the CVEs CAPE ESPERANCE and ALTAMAHA, and the DDs AYLWIN, DEWEY,
and HICKOX. Lesser damage was sustained by at least 19 other vessels, from CAs
down to DEs. Fires occurred on three carriers when planes were smashed in their
hangars; and some 146 planes on various ships were lost or damaged beyond
economical repair by the fires, by being smashed up, or by being swept
overboard. About 790 officers and men were lost or killed, and 80 were injured.
Several surviving destroyers reported rolling 70 or more; and we can only
surmise how close this was to capsizing completely for some of them. It was the
greatest loss that we have taken in the Pacific without compensatory return
since the First Battle of Savo.
2. In the light of hindsight it is easy to see how any of several measures
might have prevented this catastrophe, but it was far less easy a problem at
the time for the men who were out there under the heaviest of conflicting
responsibilities. The important thing is for it never to happen again; and
hence, while it is impracticable herein to go into all the factors involved and
the experiences undergone, some of the outstanding lessons will be discussed.
3. Possibly, too much reliance was placed on the analysis broadcast from the
Fleet Weather Central, Pearl Harbor. Weather data was lacking from an area some
240 to 300 miles in diameter (where the storm was actually centered); and the
immediate signs of it in the operating area were not heeded early enough.
Groups of the Third Fleet tried to avoid the storm center, but neither
radically enough nor to best advantage, since their information as to its
location and path was meager. Fleet damage and losses were accentuated by the
efforts of vessels and subordinate commanders to maintain fleet courses,
speeds, and formations during the storm. Commanding officers failed to realize
sufficiently in advance of the fact that it was necessary for them to give up
the attempt, and give all their attention to saving their ships. There was a
lack of appreciation by subordinate commanders and commanding officers that
really dangerous weather conditions existed, until it was too late to make the
preparations for security that might have been helpful.
4. The following conditions were typical during the typhoon:
(a) Visibility zero to a thousand yards.
(b) Ships not merely rolling, but heeled far over continually by the force of
the wind, thus leaving them very little margin for further rolling to leeward.
(c)Water being taken in quantity through ventilators, blower intakes, and every
topside opening.
(d) Switchboards and electrical machinery of all kinds shorted and drowned out,
with fires from short circuits. Main distribution board in engine room shorted
by steam moisture when all topside openings were closed to keep out water.
(e) Free water up to two or three feet over engines or fireroom floor plates,
and in many other compartments. It apparently all came in from above; there is
no evidence of ships' seams parting.
(f) Loss of steering control, failure of power and lighting, and stoppage of
main propulsion plant. Loss of radar and of all ability to communicate.
(g) Planes on carriers going adrift, crashing into each other, and starting
fires.
(h) Wind velocities and seas that carried away masts, stacks, boats, davits,
and deck structures generally, and made it impossible for men to secure gear
that had gone adrift, or to jettison or strike below topside weights when the
necessity had become apparent. Men could not even stay up where they would have
a chance of getting clear of the ship.
(I) Maneuvering up to the time of sinking, in the attempt to maintain station,
by all ships that were lost. DEWEY, saved by apparently a narrow margin, had
given up the attempt.
(j) The storm "taking charge" and making impossible various evasive
and security measures which might have been effective at an earlier stage.
(k) Testimony that the ships lost took a long roll to leeward, varying from 50
to 80, hung there a little while, and then went completely over, floating a
short time before going down.
5. The following tabulation does not purport to be the whole story, either for
the ships mentioned or for the Fleet as a whole. It does, however, show that
some ships, although of the same class as those lost, and undergoing the same
punishment from the weather, survived nevertheless. It also indicates some
differences in their condition and in the measures taken. Nobody can say,
however, how far the outcome was due to these conditions and measures (or lack
of them) and how far to blind chance.
6.
|
Class |
All of FARRAGUT Class |
Both FLETCHER Class |
||||
|
Name |
Hull |
Monaghan |
Dewey |
Aylwin |
Spence |
Hickox |
|
Outcome |
Sunk |
Sunk |
Survived |
Survived |
Sunk |
Survived |
|
Fuel on hand |
70% |
76% |
? |
80% |
15% |
14% |
|
Water Ballast |
No |
No |
Yes |
? |
Very little |
Fully Ballasted |
|
Fuel to high side |
No |
No |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
? |
|
Conf. "A" taken |
Yes |
? |
Yes |
? |
No |
? |
|
Top weight removed |
No |
? |
Yes |
? |
? |
? |
|
Free Water in Ship |
Yes |
? |
Some |
Yes |
Yes |
Some |
|
Rolled and Recovered |
70 degrees |
? |
75 degrees |
70 degrees |
Hung at 50 degrees, capsized |
70 degrees |
7. Various weaknesses were brought to light in our forecasting and
dissemination of weather information, in structural details which permitted
flooding with consequent loss of power, short circuiting, etc., and in the
stability of some of our destroyers. Measures to correct these faults are being
taken as far as possible. Yet the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet wishes to
emphasize that to insure safety at sea, the best that science can devise and
that naval organization can provide must be regarded only as an aid, and never
as a substitute for the good seamanship, self- reliance, and sense of ultimate
responsibility which are the first requisites in a seaman and naval officer.
8. A hundred years ago, a ship's survival depended almost solely on the
competence of her master and on his constant alertness to every hint of change
in the weather. To be taken aback or caught in full sail on by even a passing
squall might mean the loss of spars or canvas; and to come close to the center
of a genuine hurricane or typhoon was synonymous with disaster. While to be
taken by surprise was thus serious, the facilities for avoiding it were meager.
Each master was dependent wholly on himself for detecting the first symptoms of
bad weather, for predicting its seriousness and movement, and for taking the
appropriate measures to, to evade it if possible and to battle through it if it
passed near to him. There was no radio by which weather data could be collected
from all over the oceans and the resulting forecasts by expert aerologists broadcasted
to him and to all afloat. There was no one to tell him that the time had now
come to strike his light sails and spars, and snug her down under close reefs
and storm trysails. His own barometer, the force and direction of the wind, and
the appearance of sea and sky were all that he had for information. Ceaseless
vigilance in watching and interpreting signs, plus a philosophy of taking no
risk in which there was little to gain and much to be lost, was what enabled
him to survive.
9. Seamen of the present day should be better at forecasting weather at sea,
independently of the radio, than were their predecessors. The general laws of
storms and the weather expectancy for all months of the year in all parts of
the world are now more thoroughly understood, more completely catalogued, and
more readily available in various publications. An intensive study of typhoons
and Western Pacific weather was made over a period of many years by Father
Depperman at the Manila observatory, and his conclusions have been embodied in
the material available to all aerologists. What Knight and Bowditch have to say
on the subject is exactly as true during this war as it was in time of peace or
before the days of the radio. Familiarity with these authorities is something
that no captain or navigator can do without. The monthly pilot charts, issued
to all ships, give excellent information as to the probable incidence and
movements of typhoons. Stress on the foregoing is no belittlement of our
aerological centers and weather broadcasts. But just as a navigator is held
culpable if he neglects "Log, Lead, and Lookout" through blind faith
in his radio fixes, so is the seaman culpable who regards personal weather
estimates as obsolete and assumes that if no radio storm warning has been received,
then all is well, and no local weather signs need cause him concern.
10. It is possible that too much reliance is being placed on outside sources
for warnings of dangerous weather, and on the ability of our splendid ships to
come through anything that wind and wave can do. If this be so, there is need
for a revival of the age-old habits of self-reliance and caution in regard to
the hazard from storms, and for officers in all echelons of command to take
their personal responsibilities in this respect more seriously.
11. The most difficult part of the whole heavy-weather problem is of course the
conflict between the military necessity for carrying out an operation as
scheduled, and the possibility of damage or loss to our ships in doing so. For
this no possible rule can be laid down. The decision must be a matter of
"calculated risk" either way. It should be kept in mind, however,
that a ship which founders or is badly damaged is a dead loss not only to the
current operation but to future ones, that the weather which hinders us may be
hindering the enemy equally, and that ships which, to prevent probable damage
and possible loss, are allowed to drop behind, or to maneuver independently,
may by that very measure be able to rejoin later and be of use in the
operation.
12. The safety of a ship against perils from storm, as well as from those of
navigation and maneuvering, is always the primary responsibility of her
commanding officer; but this responsibility is also shared by his immediate
superiors in operational command since by the very fact of such command the
individual commanding officer is not free to do at any time what his own
judgment might indicate. Obviously no rational captain will permit his ship to
be lost fruitlessly through blind obedience to plan or order, since by no
chance could that be the intention of his superior. But the degree of a ship's
danger is progressive and at the same time indefinite. It is one thing for a
commanding officer, acting independently in time of peace, to pick a course and
speed which may save him a beating from the weather, and quite another for him,
in time of war, to disregard his mission and his orders and leave his station
and duty.
13. It is here that the responsibility rests on unit, group, and force commanders,
and that their judgment and authority must be exercised. They are of course the
ones best qualified to weigh the situation and the relative urgency of safety
measures versus carrying on with the job in hand. They frequently guard
circuits and possess weather codes not available to all ships; and it goes
without saying that any storm warnings or important weather information which
they are not sure everybody ha received should be re-transmitted as far as
practicable. More than this, they must be conscious of the relative
inexperience in seamanship, and particularly hurricane seamanship, of many of
their commanding officers, despite their superb fighting qualities. One
division commander reports that his captains averaged eight years or less out
of the Naval Academy, and this is probably typical.
14. It is most definitely part of the senior officer's responsibility to think
in terms of the smallest ship and most inexperienced commanding officer under
him. He cannot take them for granted, give them tasks and stations, and assume
either that they will be able to keep up and come through any weather that his
own big ship can; or that they will be wise enough to gauge the exact moment
when their tasks must be abandoned in order for them to keep afloat. The order
for ships to be handled and navigated wholly for their own preservation should
be originated early enough by the seniors, and not be necessarily withheld
until the juniors request it. The very gallantry and determination of our young
commanding officers need to be taken into account here as a danger factor,
since their urge to keep on, to keep up, to keep station, and to carry out
their mission in the face of any difficulty, may deter them from doing what is
actually wisest and most profitable in the long run.
15. Yet if the O.T.C. is to be held responsible for his smaller vessels, he
must be kept aware of their conditions, and the onus of this rests on the
commanding officers themselves. Each of them must not only do whatever he is
free and able to do for his ship's safety, but must also keep his superiors in
the chain of command fully informed as to his situation. If there is anything
in his ship's particular condition or in the way she is taking the weather that
worries him, he should not hesitate to pass the information to his seniors. To
let this be regarded as a sign of faint- heartedness is to invite disaster, and
seniors should indoctrinate their commanding officers accordingly. Going still
further, it has been shown that at sea the severity of the weather may develop
to a point where, regardless of combat commitments of the high command, the
situation will require independent action by a junior without reference to his
senior. This becomes mandatory if grave doubts arise in the mind of the junior
as to the safety of his vessel, the lives of its crew, and the loss of valuable
government property and equipment.
16. The commanders of all echelons in the Pacific Fleet will impress upon their
subordinates the necessity for giving full consideration to the adverse weather
likely to be encountered in the Western Pacific, particularly the presence of
tropical disturbances and the formation and movement of typhoons. In this
connection, each commanding officer should refresh himself on Knight and
Bowditch, not only as to the "Laws of Storms", but also as to
ship-handling in heavy weather. In order to know what outside weather reports
are broadcast and what he should be getting, each commanding officer should be
familiar with Radio Weather Aids to Navigation (H.O. 206), and its
confidential supplement H.O. 206-C-S (A). This publication, as well as the Navy
Weather Forecast Code No. 1 (CSP-946) should be on all DDs and DEs, etc.
Even more important, a commanding officer should check up on his own ship's
system of handling dispatches, to make sure that every incoming dispatch about
prospective weather is viewed and understood by himself or some other officer
with experience enough to grasp its significance. It should by no chance get
buried in files and overlooked. This applies even more strongly to local
observations. Preoccupation with the job in hand, or a desire not to disturb
the skipper, should never result in disregard of a rapidly falling barometer.
17. Steps must be taken to insure that commanding officers of all vessels,
particularly destroyers and smaller craft, are fully aware of the stability
characteristics of their ships; that adequate security measures regarding
water-tight integrity are enforced; and that effect upon stability of free
liquid surfaces is thoroughly understood. Fore preparing the ship against
expected heavy weather, the basic written authorities are:
(a) Damage Control Book for ship concerned.
(b) Ballasting Instructions issued by the Type Maintenance
Administration concerned.
(c) Notes on Stability of Ships in a Seaway, (Pacific Fleet Maintenance
Confidential Letter No. 7-44)
(d) Booklet of Inclining Experiment Data for either ship or class.
Issued by BuShips.
(e) Damage Control Instructions (FTP 170-B)
(f) "Derangement of Electrical Equipment caused by Ventilation
Conditions", BuShips Bulletin of Information, No. 12, p. 9.
(g) Stability and Compartmentation of Ships (C&R Bulletin No. 14).
18. In conclusion, both seniors and juniors alike must realize that in bad
weather, as in most other situations, safety and fatal hazard are not separated
by any sharp boundary line, but shade gradually from one into the other. There
is no little red light which is going to flash on and inform commanding
officers or higher commanders that from then on there is extreme danger from
the weather, and that measures for ships' safety must now take precedence over
further efforts to keep up with the formation or to execute the assigned task.
This time will always be a matter of personal judgment. Naturally no commander
is going to cut thin the margin between staying afloat and foundering, but he
may nevertheless unwittingly pass the danger point even though no ship is yet in
extremis. Ships that keep on going as long as the severity of wind and sea
has not yet come close to capsizing them or breaking them in two, may
nevertheless become helpless to avoid these catastrophes later if things get
worse. By then they may be unable to steer any heading but in the trough of the
sea, or may have their steering control, lighting , communications, and main
propulsion disabled, or may be helpless to secure things on deck or to jettison
topside weights. The time for taking all measures for a ship's safety is while
still able to do so. Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging
in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at
sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.
C.W. NIMITZ
O.L. Thorne,
Flag Secretary
Source: Pacific Fleet Confidential Letters, World War II Command File,
Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard.
[all these letters are now declassified]
10 April 2001
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